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This work is set in the context of perioperative practice in difficult airway management. It 
integrates a root cause analysis and fish bone technique to investigate a critical incident in 
temporary yet crucial equipment failure. Risk management and incident reporting is analysed 
alongside human factors in the operating theatre environment. Finally, recommendations for risk 
reduction, vigilance and checking vital airway equipment are made in anaesthetic practice.
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Introduction
Critical incident reporting (CIR) is a tool 
for quality improvement, and is arguably 
a ‘window to the system’ (Staender et 
al 2011), revealing the weaknesses 
involved in an organisation. Staender et 
al (2011) argued that critical incident 
reporting and analysis is a beneficial 
resource for healthcare staff to gain 
experience and to learn from, in order 
to protect patients. Howell et al (2015) 
reported an analysis of approximately 5.8 
million near misses and incidents that 
caused patient harm or death from the 
National Reporting and Learning System 
(NRLS) database over a ten year period. 
They concluded that 70.3% of incidents 
reported caused no harm to patients. 
Howell et al (2015) further stipulated that 
when staff are kept informed, receive 
feedback and when reporting systems are 
confidential, the number of critical incidents 
reported increases.
Critical incident analysis is used and 
greatly appreciated in the discipline of 
anaesthetics, yet it comes with obstacles 
such as personal lack of commitment to the 
process, fear of negative consequences and 
the potential for exposing vulnerabilities 
(Vachon & LeBlanc 2011). It is thus 
becoming increasingly important for the 
anaesthetic nurse specialist (ANS) and 
other healthcare professionals working 
in the role of anaesthetic assistant in 
particular, to be aware of what a critical 
incident is and how to report it in order to 
provide safe patient care. 
For this article, the authors will evaluate a 
critical incident of anaesthetic equipment 
failure during an unanticipated difficult 
airway in an operating theatre department 
using a root cause analysis (RCA) 
framework. The incident involves an 
elective patient scheduled for ear, nose 
and throat (ENT) surgery in which, despite 
intensive preoperative airway assessment 
by the anaesthetist, the patient’s difficult 
airway for intubation went unnoticed. 
Also included in this article is discussion 
of the history and background of incident 
reporting and current implications to the 
speciality of anaesthetics. 
History of critical incident 
analysis
Incident reporting has its origins in military 
aviation and has derived from the work 
of Flanagan (1954), who developed the 
critical incident technique primarily to 
improve safety and performance among 
military pilots. However, Cooper et al (1978) 
are unquestionably the pioneers of incident 
reporting in anaesthesia. They published 
their landmark paper on the application of 
incident technique, used to examine causes 
and later prevention strategies for adverse 
anaesthetic outcomes. They utilised a 
‘modified critical incident technique’ 
to interview anaesthetists and obtain 
descriptions of preventable incidents. Over 
the years, aviation has developed a number 
of defensive strategies and has achieved 
remarkable success in improving safety, 
with Toff (2010) articulating that applying 
some of the lessons learnt in aviation has 
helped to make healthcare safer. 
Anaesthesia was the first speciality to make 
use of the incident reporting technique in 
clinical care. Reed et al (2013) surveyed 
national reporting systems in six European 
countries and found that all reporting 
systems, whether at national or local 
level, are necessary for optimal and safe 
functioning of organisational systems. 
There has been an on-going debate as 
to why anaesthesia has evolved from 
aviation specifically in comparison to other 
specialities in healthcare. Toff (2010) 
suggested that the three-step analogues 
between aviation and anaesthesia are 
similar: take off, cruise and landing in 
aviation; induction, maintenance and 
emergence in anaesthesia. Toff (2010) 
further postulated that anaesthesia has 
always adopted aviation techniques and is 
highly proactive in the promotion of human 
factors in clinical practice. 
This proactive approach is the strategy 
at the forefront of the World Health 
Organisation surgical safety checklist 
(WHO 2008), which was introduced with 
the support from National Reporting 
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(Vachon & LeBlanc 2011). This emulates 
the role of the ANS, whose advanced 
knowledge ensures involvement and 
competence in CIA. 
Root cause analysis
Within CIA, there are a number of 
frameworks and models available which 
help guide professionals in a variety of 
disciplines to analyse critical incidents. 
Popular frameworks include the conceptual 
model (Ochberg et al 2007) and root 
cause analysis (RCA) (Bowie et al 2013). 
Uberoi et al (2007) suggested that RCA 
is a tool to identify prevention strategies, 
a process that is part of the drive to build 
a safety custom and move away from a 
blame culture.
RCA has been defined by Bowie et al 
(2013) as a structured approach to the 
investigation of patient safety incidents 
that is commonly applied in modern health 
systems worldwide, particularly in acute 
settings. The goal of RCA is to find out what 
happened, why it occurred and how to 
prevent it happening again. In healthcare 
organisations, nurses and other healthcare 
professionals have a central role in patient 
safety and are integral in the RCA process. It 
is a framework that works well to encourage 
participation, the focus is taken away from 
the individual hence people are less likely 
to react defensively. However, despite the 
benefits of this approach, there has been 
insufficient evidence to suggest that RCA 
is a proven patient safety practice (Uberoi 
et al 2007). In fact, the limitations to the 
RCA process includes its lack of credibility 
in defining a true cause, as it is impossible 
to know if the root cause uncovered by 
the analysis actually caused the incident. 
Furthermore, RCA is labour intensive, which 
is off-putting in today’s already constrained 
healthcare system.
The RCA process under the leadership of 
a facilitator involves an inter-professional 
team approach to direct the investigation, 
analysis of interviews and then building a 
timeline of events with goals to determine 
the underlying causes of the incident. The 
process can involve a five-way approach 
(Ohno 1988) in which teams elaborate on 
the root causes of the incident and develop 
an action plan to address these. Arguably 
this is an overly simplistic approach with the 
‘fishbone technique’ being more favoured. 
a breadth of information. The result is 
a sharing forum of repeated problems 
that may not be immediately obvious to 
individual hospitals (Reed et al 2013). 
However, despite NRLS, patient safety in 
anaesthetics remains constrained in that 
critical incidents are only being shared 
primarily at local level and not regionally 
among health and social care trusts. Local 
trust level reports can lead to adjustment 
and changes to work practices thereby 
improving patient safety at departmental 
level (Tewari & Sinha 2013). Therefore 
incident reporting is a vital technique used 
in many disciplines including aviation, 
communications, military and home 
security, nursing, critical care, teaching and 
policing (Butterfield et al 2005). 
Incident reporting 
An important aspect of incident reporting 
is safety cultures in the organisation. A 
no-blame culture is desired to embrace 
reporting, yet there is still the perception in 
healthcare that the reporting of problems 
might lead to disciplinary action from 
the employer or the threat of legal action 
from a patient. Haller et al (2011) argued 
that this leads to major difficulties in the 
reporting of incidents. Practical measures 
can be implemented to instil this no-
blame culture, such as de-identification of 
reporters, protection of ‘whistle blowers’ 
from unwanted reprisals and providing 
meaningful feedback and change from 
reports (Howell et al 2015, Reed et al 
2013). Staender (2011) argued that 
organisations must recognise and publicly 
acknowledge the inevitability of human 
error and adopt a non-punitive stance 
towards error, at both the individual and 
departmental level. This open-minded 
acknowledgement implies a strong potential 
for learning, which Staender (2011) argued 
is the primary idea behind the concept of 
incident reporting. 
Tewari and Sinha (2013) suggested that 
turning these reported incidents into new 
learning will expedite changes in clinical 
management, thus optimising patient 
safety. In healthcare, critical incident 
analysis (CIA) has been used for continuous 
professional development in postgraduate 
nursing and medicine. Research has 
found it to be a process which enables 
professionals to access their feelings, 
engage new knowledge and examine values 
and Learning system. Lingard et al 
(2008) highlighted that the WHO (2008) 
preoperative checklist briefings have 
been shown to reduce the number of 
communication failures and to promote 
collaborative teamwork. The objective 
was to reduce the number of surgical 
complications and deaths. Toff (2010) 
purported that the introduction of 
preoperative briefings has resulted in an 
improved atmosphere in theatre, with all 
staff feeling included and empowered. 
Furthermore, in the author’s (NP) clinical 
area, the WHO checklist is mandatory and 
has been well received by all members of 
the perioperative team. This process, along 
with critical incident analysis, highlights the 
impact of human factors in healthcare and 
ultimately provides safer anaesthetic care.
Background to the incident
During the incident in question a fibre optic 
screen failed during anaesthesia induction. 
Fasting and Gisvold (2002) suggested 
that 25% of equipment problems could be 
related to human error and furthermore that 
18 of 29 cases were related to inadequate 
pre-use checks. Cassidy et al (2011) argued 
that it may be easier for a clinician to 
blame the equipment rather than to admit 
a misunderstanding or mistake. A ‘human 
factors’ approach (Reason 1990) can be 
utilised to focus on the organisational 
factors that led to the incident which 
occurred, rather than zoning individual 
blame (Mahajan 2010). The authors believe 
that latent human factors contributed to 
the situation of the unanticipated difficult 
airway in our theatre. The factors included 
an inadequate skill mix and the competency 
of staff, including the specialist anaesthetic 
nurse who had to troubleshoot technical 
issues with the anaesthetic equipment. 
Cassidy et al (2011) drew attention to the 
National Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) 
which since 2006 has worked closely with 
clinicians in an attempt to extract useful 
lessons from incidents and to translate 
them into improvements in clinical practice. 
Since April 2016 a National Reporting and 
Learning System (NRLS) in the UK has been 
under the umbrella of NHS Improvement. 
The NRLS is the largest reporting system 
in the world (Howell et al 2015). This 
e-forum aims to include all incidents related 
to anaesthesia and therefore to capture 
Critical incident analysis: Equip to avoid failure
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An important aspect of incident reporting is 
safety cultures in the organisation
The fishbone technique displays a diagram 
perusing the possible causes and influences 
of the incident and improvements in 
practice to prevent recurrence (see Figure 
1) (Ishikawa 1968). The belief of the RCA 
model is that multiple errors and system 
flaws often happen in a critical incident 
before there is an impact on a patient, 
hence the occurrence of latent factors 
(DH 2000). RCA helps to interlink the 
contributing factors and analyses how the 
incident occurred, providing suggestions to 
improve the system for the future.
In 2007, it was reported that more than 
90,000 patients die and almost one 
million are harmed each year because of 
hospital blunders, with research findings 
suggesting that up to half of the mistakes 
are preventable (Mendick et al 2015). The 
success and quality of incident reporting 
is contingent upon the enthusiasm 
among staff (Tewari & Sinha 2013) with 
organisations playing a key role in ensuring 
that they deliver on effective and concise 
incident reporting. Notably, incident reports 
on their own tell little about the causes 
and prevention of a critical incident. 
Clinical expertise is required as well as a 
good understanding of the incident and 
its context by whoever is involved and is 
reporting (Vincent 2004). Lack of funding 
and time dedicated to incident analysis 
however remains an organisational hurdle. 
For the NHS to deliver a safer healthcare 
system, it is necessary to go beyond 
uncovering what happened in an incident 
but to reflecting on what the incident 
reveals, such as the gaps and inadequacies 
in the healthcare system (Vincent 2004). 
Specialised equipment plays a central role 
in anaesthetic practice; an unintended 
consequence is the potential for 
malfunction or misuse (Cassidy et al 2011). 
The context of the critical clinical incident 
described below was an operating theatre 
department. RCA will be utilised in the 
analysis with particular emphasis on the 
fishbone technique.
The clinical incident 
outlined
The critical incident involved an 
unanticipated difficult airway on a patient 
scheduled for elective, ENT surgery. 
A difficult intubation is defined by the 
American Society of Anaesthesiologists 
as tracheal intubation requiring more 
than three attempts, in the presence or 
absence of tracheal pathology (ASA 2003). 
Unanticipated difficult airways are always 
feared amongst anaesthetists (Norskov 
et al 2013) and ANS alike, yet difficult 
laryngoscopy and tracheal intubations occur 
in 1.5-8% of general anaesthetics (Lee et al 
2006). For all patients receiving a general 
anaesthetic with an attempted intubation, 
an airway management score such as the 
Wilson Score (1988), is recorded (Norskov 
et al 2013).
Multiple tools are used in clinical practice, 
including Mallampatti scores, thyromental 
distance and neck mobility assessments. 
In acute healthcare settings multi-variate 
scoring systems are used which attribute 
values to certain clinical factors. An 
example is SARI (simplified airway risk 
index), where a score of more than three 
is deemed a predicted difficult airway risk 
(Norskov et al 2016). There is on-going 
debate over the credibility of preoperative 
airway risk assessments with the Difficult 
Airway Society (DAS 2004) disputing 
their value. Yet The American Society of 
Anaesthesiologists (2003) recommends 
preoperative assessment of all patients’ 
airways based on eleven anatomical 
parameters. Overall, there is no ideal 
airway assessment tool and the lack of 
statistical predictive power of individual 
airway tests is well accepted. Therefore 
airway assessments should utilise multiple 
components to increase their reliability, 
yet it must be remembered that even in 
combination, these tests are not diagnostic. 
It is the anaesthetic team’s role to be 
competent and aware of the various airway 
assessments and airway emergency 
algorithms with their significance for safe 
anaesthetic delivery to all patients. 
The consultant anaesthetist performed an 
airway assessment on each of the patients 
scheduled for the elective list and found 
no apparent or predicted difficulties. These 
assessments included Mallampati scores, 
Wilson score and a thorough medical history 
from all patients prior to attendance at 
theatre. However, for the last person on the 
list an unanticipated difficult airway was 
identified when the anaesthetist performed 
laryngoscopy to visualise the vocal cords. 
Endotracheal intubation and maintenance 
of airway patency protects the lungs 
from aspiration and creates a conduit 
for ventilation (Beaubien & Baker 2010). 
When this intubation was unsuccessful, a 
second attempt using a bougie failed. The 
anaesthetist required the difficult airway 
trolley to use a disposable fibre optic 
scope. The ANS, a recognised leader in 
theatre, remained with the anaesthetist and 
assisted in all steps of airway management. 
The timeline of events from this incident 
followed the difficult airway algorithm (DAS 
2004). The patient was easily ventilated 
and thus remained well oxygenated 
throughout the procedure. 
There are many clinical risk factors that 
may be associated with difficult intubation 
in adult patients such as increased age, 
male gender, high body mass index (BMI) 
and history of obstructive sleep apnoea 
(Schaeuble & Heidegger 2012). The 
potential risk factors of the patient in this 
incident included a slightly high BMI and 
Work Environment
Staffing Skill Mix
Technician 
Support
Patient
Beard
BMI
Supervision
Anaesthetic 
Equipment
Video Scope
Anaesthetic 
Equipment
Failure
Figure 1 Fishbone technique implemented in practice 
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Reducing risk in airway management has 
been introduced in various hospitals to 
include regular workshop training in airway 
management techniques (Kuduvalli et al 
2008). Repeated individual training has 
been shown to improve performance, both 
initially and over time, with a recommended 
interval of six months to refresh each 
professional. Limitations to such training 
are organisational factors, lack of time, 
money and resources to provide training.
Recommendations for future 
practice
Recommendations suggested by the 
inter-professional theatre team included 
simulated clinical emergency scenarios, 
which would build knowledge, confidence 
and competence to solve equipment 
problems in the future. Further suggestions 
were regular updates and training with 
the anaesthetic technician (a member of 
the anaesthetic team in N Ireland) who 
is heavily involved with all anaesthetic 
equipment and monitors. 
Finally, as a result if this incident, the 
introduction of a daily checklist for the 
difficult airway trolley was implemented 
creating a safer patient and practitioner 
environment. Having a specific checklist 
enables the trolley and all equipment to be 
checked daily and it ensures that all the kit 
is working correctly for the next 24 hours. 
The ANS believes that by checking the 
trolley daily nursing staff will become more 
familiar with the equipment and how to use 
it in an emergency. 
Conclusion
Although anaesthesia is a medical 
speciality with a high level of uncertainty 
and variability due to the complexity 
and individuality of humans, it is now 
considered an ultra-safe system, a pioneer 
in the field of patient safety (Cuvelier et al 
2012). Incident reporting is a key factor 
in achieving the above with evidence 
suggesting that anaesthetic critical incident 
studies plant ideas for other specialities, 
either directly or indirectly (Merry 2008). 
Anaesthetic nurse specialists and 
anaesthetists are proud of their reputation 
for safety in an improved learning culture. In 
an increasingly pluralistic health economy 
where patient safety is a key driver, UK 
the presence of a beard, which has the 
potential to cause ventilation problems due 
to a less than optimal mask seal. These 
factors however, were considered low risk 
by the anaesthetist as other assessments 
presented normal findings. 
When the difficult airway trolley arrived with 
the specialist equipment, the anaesthetist 
wished to use the fibre optic scope to assist 
intubation, but when the screen was turned 
on, it remained blank. The ANS checked all 
connections to no avail and began to feel a 
sense of anxiety and vulnerability, which she 
believed was felt by the rest of the team in 
theatre. The technical supervisor (N Ireland 
specific post) for anaesthetic equipment 
was not available which emphasised the 
reliance on support from other areas for 
troubleshooting technical equipment. 
Anaesthetic equipment is important for 
the safe conduct of anaesthesia, but 
malfunction can contribute to morbidity 
and mortality (Fasting & Gisvold 2002). 
Frequent checking of specialist and 
emergency equipment is imperative for safe 
anaesthetic care. As the ANS repeatedly 
tried to fix the equipment with another staff 
nurse, the anaesthetist remained manually 
ventilating the patient through a laryngeal 
mask airway in place, which is safe practice. 
Eventually, after approximately five minutes, 
the screen came on and the anaesthetist 
was able to use the scope to assist in 
intubating the patient successfully. An 
incident report was completed and a debrief 
carried out, led by the ANS and including 
all nursing members involved in that 
patient’s care. 
Fishbone technique
The fishbone technique of RCA is another 
name for cause and effect technique, which 
ultimately aims to identify many possible 
causes for a consequence or problem. 
The ANS initiated this technique (see 
Figure 1) as it allowed all team members 
to contribute to the solution. The first 
step is to define the problem as a team: 
anaesthetic equipment failure due to lack 
of daily checking of battery life, which led to 
an unnecessary delay in patient intubation. 
Although all equipment should be checked 
prior to use, it had not been routine practice 
to check the difficult airway trolley daily, 
even though it is established best practice 
to do so.
The next step suggested by using the 
fishbone technique is to assess the main 
factors of cause. Among those agreed were: 
possible malfunction of the anaesthetic 
equipment, training issues, troubleshooting 
when equipment fails, skill mix in theatre for 
that specific workload, poor location of the 
theatre (it was the farthest from the location 
of senior nursing assistance), and lack of 
supervision. When discussing the factors all 
team members agreed that a contributing 
factor was training in troubleshooting 
specialist intubation equipment.
According to the NMC code of conduct 
(2015), every registered nurse must keep 
knowledge and skills up to date throughout 
their working life and furthermore must take 
part in appropriate learning and practice 
activities that maintain and develop their 
performance and competence. Staffing 
issues were a contributing factor which 
the whole perioperative team agreed on. 
As allocated team leader on the day of the 
incident, poor skill mix and lack of senior 
staff members to assist with any difficulties 
was of concern. Skill mix and staff allocation 
is the senior nurse’s responsibility, it was a 
feature over which the ANS felt they had no 
direct influence. As a new and developing 
leader in a theatre environment, the ANS 
had a heightened awareness of vulnerability 
and lack of confidence. 
Leadership is essential especially in the 
operating department, which is regarded 
as a critical and complex environment, 
comparable to aircraft and air traffic 
control teams because we operate in 
hazardous environments where safety 
is paramount (Helmreich 2000). This 
experience enhanced the ANS’s leadership 
capabilities and confidence. Feedback from 
other nursing colleagues and anaesthetists 
involved in this case was relatively positive. 
They believed that the ANS led and coped 
competently with the emergency situation 
despite her vulnerability and lack of 
leadership experience. 
The final part of RCA is to create 
improvements in the system to reduce 
latent factors and reduce the chances of 
recurrence. Although some difficult airways 
can be predicted, even the most thorough 
assessment of the airway may not detect 
the possibility of a difficult intubation and 
associated problems with ventilation of 
the patient (Beaubien & Baker 2010). 
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Frequent checking of specialist and emergency 
equipment is imperative for safe anaesthetic care
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hospitals might wish to use high reporting 
rates as one of the markers of success 
in the creation of a safer healthcare 
environment (Hutchinson et al 2009). 
However, Howell et al (2015) reminds us 
that the results from their analysis of over 
five million reports over a ten year period 
suggest ‘that reporting rates should not be 
used to assess hospital safety’ per se. The 
environmental culture requires adjustment 
if near misses and patient harm rates are 
to be reduced. This will need to include 
adjustments such as increased staffing 
numbers and encouraging a blame free 
culture with confidentiality and education at 
its core (Howell et al 2015). 
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